First Distinction. Second Part. On the Proper Idea of a Sacrament and on its Institution

Question One. Whether the Idea Definitive of a Sacrament is what the Master Posits: ‘A Sacrament is the Visible Form of an Invisible Grace’

174. Whether the definitive idea of a sacrament is what the Master posits: “A sacrament is the visible form of an invisible grace.”

175. It seems that it is not:

For a definition is only of that which is per se one, Metaphysics 7.12.1037b25-26. A sacrament is not per se one, because according to Augustine On John homily 80 n.3 (and it is in Gratian Decretum p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.54), “A word is applied to the element and it becomes a sacrament” [n.3]; but word and element do not make something per se one, for the second is permanent and the first successive. Likewise, a definition is made of genus and differences [Metaphysics 7.12.1037b29-30].

176. Again, second, if a sacrament is a form, then it is either a form that is the other part of a composite or it is an exemplar form, for thus is ‘form’ divided. But it is not a form in the first way, because a sacrament is not a part of grace, nor in the second way because the example imitates the exemplar and participates it, but not so grace and sacrament.

177. Again, third as follows: that in certain sacraments there is only the words, which are not a visible but only an audible sign, as is shown below in the sacraments of penance and marriage [IV d.14 q.4 nn.2-3, d.27 q.2 n.2]; therefore a sacrament is wrongly called ‘visible’.

178. Again, I ask as follows: of one thing there is only one proper definition; but of sacrament other definitions are assigned, as is plain from the Master in the text and Hugo of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith I p.9 ch.2. “A sacrament is a bodily or material element, proposed outwardly in perceptible way, representing by likeness and signifying by institution and containing by sanctification some invisible and spiritual grace;” and Augustine, City of God 10.5, “A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing.”

179. To the contrary:

The Master in the text, “A sacrament is the visible form of an invisible grace.”

I. To the Question

180. Here one must consider, first, what there can and what there cannot be a definition of; second, from the first, whether there can be a definition of a sacrament; third, if this definition is the one that is here in question.

A. What there Can and Cannot be a Definition of

181. As to the first, one must note that anything at all (whether being or nonbeing) that can be conceived and signified can have some account given of its name, which name would make explicitly and distinctly explicit what the name implicitly and confusedly means, and any such account can be called a definition. So Metaphysics 4.7.1012a23-24, “The account that a name signifies is a definition,” by extension of the name ‘definition’. But a definition strictly speaking is only a statement signifying the true ‘what it is to be’ of a thing (Topics 1.4.101b39, “Now a term, that is, a definition, is a statement signifying the ‘what it is to be’,” that is, of the thing defined). And so not any account of a name is a definition, but an account by which is distinctly indicated the true ‘what it is to be’ of a thing.

182. There is no definition properly of non-being, and that whether ‘non-being’ is taken properly for what is impossible (which includes contradiction) or for what is pure negation or privation, because non-being does not have a ‘what it is’.

183. Nor is there an account either of that which is not per se one, as is plain in Metaphysics 7, as was argued for the opposite [n.175]. But by ‘per se one’ I mean either what is simple or what is composed of what is per se actual and per se potential. Nor does this unity prevent the defined thing from including in it something as the term per se of its dependence (as accident includes substance, or as something that is naturally simultaneous with it the way relative includes correlative). But what is prevented is that nothing is included in it as a per se part that is not disposed to something else in the same thing (as per se act is disposed to per se potency, or as a part of the same act, or of the same potency, to another part).

184. Nor, third, is there a definition of a being of reason, which is only a diminished being, because a ‘what’, just as also being, only properly belongs to real being, as is plain in Metaphysics 5.7-8.1017a22-7b26, 6.2.1026a33-35. And I do not mean here by ‘being of reason’ what is in the intellect as object (for thus every universal is in the soul), nor what is only in the intellect as in a subject (for thus intellection and knowledge are in the soul, which knowledge, however, and consideration are real forms and in the genus of quality). But I mean by being of reason a being in the soul as considered secondarily, and not as considered primarily (and to this consideration the soul is first moved by something outside); rather I mean a being in that which is primarily a considered thing qua considered. And such, to speak summarily, is only a relation of reason, because nothing has being precisely in being considered qua being considered, save the comparison by which the considered thing is compared to something else by the act of the considerer. So diminished being, as it is taken here, is universally a being of reason.

185. Fourth, there is no ‘what’, expressible in a definition, in the case of something that one can only have a simply simple concept of, for according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b25-26, “a definition is a long statement” and “the term must be a long statement” expressing the ‘what’ and the ‘what sort of’; for a definition distinctly explains what the defined thing implicitly imports. Therefore it must be the case that more than one concept can be formed of the defined thing, namely a quidditative and a qualitative concept, by which the defined thing is explained.

186. Fifth, definition is not of a singular, because there cannot be a statement expressing the quiddity of a singular without that statement explaining something that does not belong to the ‘what it was to be’, as is plain in Ord. II d.3 nn.192-193, 204-206.

187. From these points follows that a definition properly speaking is of a positive being [n.182], that is per se one [n.183], real [n.184], really composite [n.185], at least as to the universal concept and as to such alone [n.186].

B. Whether there Can be a Definition of a Sacrament

188. About the second main point [n.180] one must consider in order whether any of the five conditions [n.187] prevents a sacrament from having a definition properly speaking. And in this regard, this second article has five conditions [n.187].

1. About a Definition’s First Condition

189. The first condition does not get in the way [sc. of a sacrament’s having a definition], which I show by conclusions arranged in order.

190. The first is this: it is possible for God to cause some invisible effect pertaining to the salvation of man as wayfarer. There is no need to prove this, because it is manifest to a theologian from divine omnipotence.

191. Secondly I say that it is possible for God to impose some sign to signify the invisible effect. This is plain because we can impose signs to signify whatever is intelligible by us. But since a sign is divided into memorial sign (which is of the past) and prognostic sign (which is of the future) and demonstrative sign (which is of the present), it is possible for God to institute any of these signs to signify his effects. There is also the proof that we can institute any of these signs to signify our effects; for thus are oaths instituted by us, and promises and signs of this sort that impose obligations, to signify a future effect of ours - and assertoric signs to signify a past or present effect of ours.

192. I further posit that it is possible for God to determine and dispose himself to cooperate with any sign (instituted by himself) so as to cause the effect signified, unless it is impeded by the indisposition of him to whom it is applied. - This is plain because it would be thus possible among us that someone, by instituting a sign of his effect, would dispose himself always to cooperate with this sort of sign unless impeded by him to whom it was applied (as that if someone were to institute as a sign of peace or kindness the touch of the hand or the raising of the finger or something of the sort, he would be able, by instituting such a sign, to determine himself always to cooperate for the signified effect, unless the indisposition of him to whom it was applied got in the way). But such a sign, with which the institutor disposes himself always to cooperate, can be called a ‘true’ or ‘certain’ sign, to distinguish it from an uncertain or equivocal sign which as equally brings with it cooperation with the thing signified or the opposite. But a sign is properly called efficacious if, when the sign is used, the thing signified follows in order of nature and not conversely, for if a sign followed the thing it signified in order of nature, although it could be a certain sign if it never lacked the preceding signified thing, yet it would not be efficacious, because in no way would its being posited have efficacy with respect to the thing signified, but conversely.

193. Lastly I say that it is possible for God to institute some sensible sign to signify the aforesaid effect and in the aforesaid way, namely with certainty and efficacy. - This is clear because we too can institute some sensible sign for signifying our effect with the other aforesaid conditions. And not only can some single sensible sign be instituted but also one including in itself several sensible elements, and sensible either to the same sense or to different senses. For just as we, in order to signify the divine perfection which is the simplest essence, can institute this statement ‘God is perfectly infinite’, which statement is constituted of many audible syllables, so we could institute some audible things and some visible things to be together a sign of our concept (as that some definite words, along with some movement of the hand and a kiss, would signify an act of benevolence).

194. From these points follows this conclusion, that the following whole statement is not in itself false (in the way that the Philosopher talks of a statement false in itself in Metaphysics 5.29.1024b26-25a2, 6.1015b16-34): ‘A sensible sign efficaciously signifying, by divine institution, the grace of God or his gratuitous effect - an effect, I say, ordered to the salvation of man the wayfarer’. For it is plain from what has been said that no particle of this statement is repugnant to another; and a statement is not false in itself (according to the Philosopher ibid.) unless the parts are contradictory with each other. This statement, then, is not about pure non-being, that is, about a pure impossible, because nothing is a pure impossible unless its account is false in itself, as is plain in Ord. I d.2 nn.70, 133. It is also plain that this account is not about a pure negation or privation, because it per se includes certain positive things. But if it is posited that this account is an account of this word ‘sacrament’, it follows that a sacrament is not a pure non-being, neither as impossible nor as negation.

195. But that this account is the account of this word ‘sacrament’ cannot be proved but must be assumed from the use of those who speak about sacrament, in the way that the signification of words must be assumed from use.

2. About a Definition’s Second Condition

196. One must consider then the second condition [n.187], namely per se unity, whether it prevents there being a definition properly speaking of a sacrament, or of what has the account of this sort of name. - But that a being that is not per se one is not definable can be understood in two ways, namely that it consists of beings either of the same genus or of different genus that however are not of a nature to constitute something per se one. The first has the name of an aggregated being (as a mound or heap), and the second is properly called a being per accidens, as is plain from Metaphysics 5.6.1015b16-34. But neither of these is properly definable: not the first, from Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-25, and not the second, from Metaphysics 7.4.1029b22-30a7.

197. It is in fact said [Richard of Middleton] that a sacrament does not properly have unity, so it is not properly definable. For it includes many things (as is touched on in the first argument to the opposite [n.175]), from which something per se one cannot come to be, namely an element (as water in the case of baptism) and spoken words (and these two are material parts) and the idea of signifying (as something formal): the first of these is a real being, the second a being of reason. From such things it is impossible for something per se one to come to be.

198. But against this: for although one accident may be in many subjects, yet it would be definable properly just like other accidents, because the manyness does not pertain per se to the idea of the accident but is as it were something added. Now in the aforesaid idea of the name [n.194] it is plain that what is called ‘sensible’ is posited as an addition to the sign. So however much there is no unity in it, yet while the other things that pertain to the formal idea of the name do not prevent per se unity, a sacrament will not for this reason be non-definable. I mean that the plurality under discussion here [n.197] is a plurality of things that come together in the sensible thing as the sensible thing signifies the foundation of the formal idea that a sacrament involves.

199. I say therefore that in the aforesaid definition [n.194] the formal element is understood to be the sign and also to be the things that per se determine the idea of a sign. Of such sort are ‘by divine institution’ and ‘efficaciously’ (the other two there, namely ‘sensible’ and ‘gratuitous effect of God’, are there as additions: the first as subject or foundation, the second as correlative of the sign). But a plurality of accident with subject, or of the subject in itself, or of correlative with correlative does not prevent the relation from being definable simply. Therefore a sacrament is not excluded by non-unity from having a definition. For this concept ‘per se one in the intellect’ is as conventional and efficacious a sign as is the concept of paternity. And just as paternity could be properly defined (notwithstanding per se unity) if paternity were in two subjects and these two were posited as additions and the correlative of father were posited as an addition, so too in the issue at hand.

3. About a Definition’s Third Condition

200. Third I say that in the aforesaid idea of the name [n.194] is included something that states a being of reason, namely that the sign is ‘by institution’. For this relation does not follow a foundation from the nature of the thing, because although there is an aptitude in the thing for signifying the effect signified, yet the actual signification only belongs to it by act of the one who imposed it. So, by restricting the definition to a ‘what’ properly speaking outside the mind, this definition does not express a ‘what’ of a sacrament, and therefore cannot be a definition in the way that a definition is the idea of a complete being outside the soul. But in the way that a definition expresses ‘one concept per se in the intellect’, whether the concept is of a thing outside the soul or of a thing of reason, a sacrament can very well be defined.

201. And in this way only, and not otherwise, are all logical intentions defined. For these intentions do not signify quiddities outside the soul. but only concepts per se one in the soul; and having a definition in this way is sufficient for science properly speaking, otherwise logic would not be a science. Also, in these definitions are found genus and difference and property, in the way that a logician speaks of genus, difference, and property; for found there is a classification in the ‘what’, in the essential ‘what sort’, and in the accidental ‘what sort’ convertible with it.

202. And so in the aforesaid idea [n.194] ‘sign’ is posited as genus, ‘by institution’ and ‘efficacious’ as difference, ‘sensible’ as the foundation of the relation, and ‘grace’ or ‘gratuitous effect of God’ as correlative.

4. About a Definition’s Fourth and Fifth Condition

203. As to the fourth and fifth conditions [n.187] there is no need to dwell on them, for it is plain that a sacrament according to the idea of the name posited above [nn.185-186] does not have a simply simple concept nor a singular concept but a universal one.

5. Conclusion

204. From what has been said [nn.189-203], the second article [nn.180, 188] is plain, that a sacrament (supposing that the idea of the name posited above [n.187] is of that sort) can be simply and per se defined in the way that second intentions are per se definable; and that absolutely nothing opposes its being most truly and absolutely defined or rather properly stated, save because in its proper formal element it is a being of reason and save because it includes something that is a being of reason.

205. From this article is plain as a corollary how knowledge ‘what it is’ and knowledge ‘whether it is’ are disposed to each other in order. For in the knowledge ‘whether it is’, according as it precedes the knowledge ‘what it is’, the understanding is not about actual existence, otherwise ‘a demonstration of which the middle is a definition’ could not be had of what does not exist (the opposite of which is maintained by the Philosopher Posterior Analytics I.8.75b21-36 and Metaphysics 7). But the ‘whether it is’ is understood of a being to which existence in fact is not repugnant. In the first of the five conditions, applying it to the issue at hand, the ‘whether it is’ was shown about a sacrament in this way, because it was shown that a sacrament is the sort of thing to which existence in fact is not repugnant [nn.191-192]. And on this supposition inquiry was further made in particular about what it is [nn.193-194].

206. Plain too is the order that knowing the sort of ‘what’ stated by the name has to knowing the ‘whether it is’, because in the first of the five conditions what was meant by the name was presupposed, and from this presupposed idea the conclusion as to ‘whether it is’ was drawn. And although the ‘what of a name’ and the ‘what of a thing’ are the same in things that have a ‘what of a thing’, yet it is first known that something is the ‘what of a name’ before it is known that it is the ‘what of a thing’. For the first is known in knowing that the name is intelligible and signifiable, and the second is known in knowing that it is of something able to be in fact. And from the idea of a concept able to be conceived and signified can be concluded that something is able to fall under the concept, and consequently that the idea expresses a true ‘what it is’.

C. What the Fitting Definition of a Sacrament is

207. About the third main point [n.180] I say that, in the way there can be a definition of a sacrament (as is plain from the second article, n.204), the definition is as follows: ‘A sensible sign efficaciously signifying, by divine institution, the grace of God or a gratuitous effect of God, that is ordered to the salvation of man as wayfarer’. And in the term ‘efficaciously’ is included both ‘with certitude’ and ‘with prediction’, where ‘with prediction’ is meant not only what is prior to the thing signified in duration but also prior to it in nature.

208. The proof is a universal one for things that are able to have a definition. For an account that expresses what is meant by a name is the same as a true definition, because, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 4.7.1012a23-24, ‘the account that a name signifies is a definition’. And this is plain through reason, because a name is imposed to signify the essence of a thing; so a statement that expresses distinctly and in its parts what is meant by a name also expresses distinctly the concept of the essence of the thing. Now the definition that has been set down, ‘A sensible sign     etc .,’ [n.207], is an account of the name ‘sacrament’ as assumed above from the use of those who speak of sacraments [n.195]; and a sacrament can have a definition in the way that beings of reason are defined. Therefore      this account is the definition of it; and that it is so is therefore proved.

209. But how it could be the definition is easily made plain, because in that account is posited something pertaining to the genus of relation, which is the genus in the sense of genus in which, in a relation of reason, genus and species are posited (namely the term ‘sign’), and the account is determined by differences in this genus (namely the genus ‘sign’), which are ‘by institution’ and ‘efficaciously’. Two things are also added there, as is universally the case in definitions of relations and relatives: one as subject or foundation, which is understood by the term ‘sensible’, and the other too, namely the correlative, which is noted by the terms ‘grace’ and ‘gratuitous’.

D. Solution of the Question

210. From the above three articles [nn.181-209] the solution of the question is plain.

For if the account [from Master Lombard] that is here being asked about [n.174] is rightly understood, and is completed through certain explicit words, one must say that it is the account properly definitive of a sacrament, in the way in which a sacrament is definable.

211. For that account [from the Master], thus understood and completed, is the same as the one before stated [n.207].

For what is posited there as ‘form’ must be understood as put for ‘sensible sign’, in the way that an image of Hercules is called the ‘form’ of Hercules.

Also what is added there as ‘visible’ must be understood as put for ‘sensible in general’, and to this extent ‘visible’ must be understood as put for the sensible object of any sense. For sight is more excellent than any other sense and has knowledge of more differences, as the Philosopher says, Metaphysics 1.1.980a25-28.

‘Visible’ there is put for ‘sensible in one or more ways’ and that whether in several ways pertaining to the same sense or to different senses.

‘Invisible grace’ there is puts for ‘gratuitous effect of God, interior, ordered to the salvation of man the wayfarer’.

But whether ‘grace’ is there taken universally for grace inhering in the soul as subject, or whether it signifies more generally (as I expressed it above) the gratuitous effect of God etc. [n.194], will be clear in the treatment of the Eucharist (d.8 q.1 nn.4-5, d.10 q.4 n.6), because in the Eucharist the ‘thing’ of the sacrament is not any grace inhering as an accident in the soul.

Now the differences specifying the sign need to be supplied, namely ‘by institution’ in distinction from a naturally signifying sign, and ‘efficaciously’ in distinction from an equivocal sign and a sign that naturally follows the thing signified.

II. To the Initial Arguments

212. To the first argument [n.175] I say that although this sort of foundation of relations includes several things that do not become something per se one (as is proved there about successive and permanent), yet it does not follow that a sacrament (as to its formal idea) is not per se one.

213. And if argument is made against this that a relation is not per se one unless it has one foundation, I reply that if perhaps this be true of real relations (about which there is a doubt, because perhaps in the case of many men pulling a boat there is a single relation of the pullers to the one thing pulled), yet in relations of reason the proposition is manifestly false, because however diverse the things are that can come together in the foundation of one relation of reason, there is only need that the many things be conceived there in the intellect as one thing with an order to some signified thing.

214. This is plain, since of this single relation which is ‘to signify good vintage’ the whole of the following can well be the foundation ‘a circle covered in leaves of ivy placed on a cross’ etc. Thus also, many statements woven together or one statement from many syllables (which make nothing per se one) are the foundation of one relation, which is ‘to signify that in God there are things that are in him intrinsically’, although however the thing signified is one and the same simplest thing.

215. To the second and third arguments [nn.176-177] the answer is plain in the explanation of the Master’s definition [nn.210-211].

216. To the fourth [n.178] the answer is plain from the definitions, because what one definition does not express another does express, so that thus, by a collection from all of them of what is found scattered about in them singly, one complete definition can be got, and of this sort is the one posited above [n.207].

Question Two. Whether for the Period of any Law Given by God Some Sacrament Needed to Have Been Instituted

217. Now that the quiddity of a sacrament has been got I ask, as to a sacrament’s institution, whether some sacrament needed to have been instituted for the period of any law given by God.

218. That no:

Because we do not read [in Sacred Scripture] about any sacrament instituted by God for the period of the law of nature; but a sacrament, according to its definition [n.207], can only be instituted by God;     therefore etc     . There is a confirmation from Gregory Moralia 4, preface n.3: “What the water of baptism among us is able to do was done among the ancients by faith alone for children, and by the virtue of sacrifice for adults;” therefore there was no sacrament among the ancients. But the idea of a sacrament against disease seems in any law to be more necessary than anything else.

219. Again, God is not the cause of sin for man nor does he directly give man occasion for sin; but that ‘there is salvation in sensible realities’ is directly an occasion for sin, namely because it is an occasion for believing that there is something divine in such sensible things, and so it is an occasion for idolatry; therefore God did not institute anything sensible so that in it or through it salvation needed to be sought.

220. Again, God did not give any law immediately but through a minister. This is plain of the Law of Moses through the whole of it; therefore similarly in the Law of the

Gospel it seems that the sacrament could have been instituted or ordained by a minister, and not necessarily immediately by God.

221. Again, since many laws were given by God, then if in the time of any law a sacrament was instituted by God, different sacraments would have been instituted at different times; for if the sacrament of a prior law had remained at the time of a later law, no other sacrament would have been instituted for the later law. But the consequent is unacceptable, because once a spoken word has been imposed by us for signifying something, it remains significative of that same thing. Therefore, much more does a sign once imposed by God remain always significative of the same thing.

222. On the contrary: Augustine Against Faustus 19 ch.11, “men cannot be conjoined under any title of religion unless they are brought together by some agreement of visible signs or sacraments.”

I. To the Question

223. Here four things must be considered: first that some sacrament did need to be instituted; second by whom, because it is immediately from God; third when, because it is for the time of any state of a wayfarer after the Fall; fourth, whether there were different sacraments for the state of different laws.

A. Some Sacrament Did Need to be Instituted

224. About the first I say that ‘some sacrament needs to be instituted’ cannot be proved with necessity: not a priori because God does nothing necessarily outside himself; nor a posteriori, or from the end, because an invisible effect could be had without a sacramental sign.

225. But that it was fitting for a sacrament to be instituted is proved by a reason similar to the one set down in the preceding question [nn.190-193], where the possibility of a sacrament was proved.

226. For it is fitting that an invisible effect, ordaining man to salvation and in need of being caused by God, be signified by some sensible thing, so that the wayfarer, acquiring knowledge of it from sensible things, might come to know the invisible effect more certainly.

227. Nor is a fitting sign of this sort of effect only a quasi theoretical one, namely one by which a concept of the thing signified (as ‘man’ signifies human nature) could be got, but a fitting sign is also a quasi practical one, namely one that signifies that the thing signified is or is coming to be.

228. Nor further is a doubtful or equivocal or uncertain practical sign a fitting sign; for although a man might be led by such a sign to knowledge of the coming to be of this sort of effect, yet he would not desire the sign to be applied to himself because of the uncertainty of the sign in respect of the coming to be of the thing signified. Therefore it was fitting for such an effect to be signified by a certain and efficacious practical sign, so that man too might know the effect from such a sign and might more ardently seek after the effect in that sign.

229. But it is not fitting that the sign be certain with the certitude of demonstration, but that it be so as it were for the most part. For just as in theoretical matters there is a sign that is necessary and a sign holding for the most part (from Posterior Analytics 1.30.87b19-25), so could a practical sign have as it were necessary certitude, if it universally and as it were necessarily accompanies the coming to be of the effect, or a certitude for the most part, if it accompanies the effect for the most part.

It is not fitting that a sensible sign be certain in the first way, because since a sensible sign needs to be applied by man, it would follow that there would be in man’s power some sign upon which God would universally cause the invisible effect; and this would take away due preparation from the receiver, since it would be sufficient for him to receive the sign however indisposed he was.

But it is fitting for such invisible effect to be signified by a sensible sign that is certain with certitude for the most part, that is to say always, unless the indisposition of the received prevent it - and this is fittingly signified by a sign naturally preceding the coming to be of the thing signified, so that thus the receiving of the sign would be as it were a disposition for the thing signified.

230. All these conditions of a sign, namely that it be practical, certain for the most part, and naturally preceding the coming to be of the thing signified, I understand to be meant by the term ‘efficacious’. But such a sign cannot be any sensible thing that signifies naturally, because nothing sensible has a natural efficacy for an invisible effect. Therefore it is fitting for the sign to be instituted or imposed.

231. In this way, therefore, one gets (according to the whole idea of a sacrament) that it was fitting for a sacrament to be instituted to cause knowledge and desire in the wayfarer in respect of the invisible effect.

232. And this is one of the ideas of a sacrament that the Master touches on in the text, namely ‘for teaching’. He touches on the other two ideas in the text, namely for ‘exercise and humility’, whose explication he touches on in the text. And these three ideas of a sacrament establish the nature of a sacrament’s institution, on the part of any private person.

233. But there is another idea that touches on fittingness on the part of the whole community. For it is fitting for men of one sect to come together under some exterior signs, by which too they may be distinguished from those of another sect; for by such signs a man knows who is of his sect and who of a different sect. And this is expedient, because those who know themselves to be of the same sect aid each other mutually in the observance of it, and those who know themselves to be of a dissimilar sect mutually avoid each other as mutually impeding each other. Now it is expedient that such a sign, uniting those who are of the same sect and distinguishing them from others, be practical with respect to some visible effect pertaining to observance of the sect.

234. It is plain, therefore, that not necessity [n.224] but fittingness can be proved by reason [nn.225-233].

235. The fact, however, is proved by authority, as will be touched on in the fourth article [n.343], because authorities do not speak of a sacrament taken universally (as it is still being treated here), but speak specifically of such and such a sacrament of such and such a law.

B. By Whom a Sacrament Needs to be Instituted

236. On the second point [n.223] I say that from one source a practical sign gets its signifying practically the thing signified, and from another source its being a certain sign.

237. The thing is clear because it is possible sometimes for someone who is not truthful to use the sign, for a sign gets its signification from previous institution; but that the sign is certain only comes from the determination of someone who cooperates with the sign to signify the thing caused. For example, if the touching of the hand is instituted as a sign of peace by some legislator in his polity, then, although the sign gets from this imposition that it does signify peace practically, yet if someone not truthful can use the sign, imposition of it by the legislator does not make the sign certain but it remains equivocal, being sometimes true (when it has the thing signified concomitant with it) and sometimes false. For someone false uses the sign without what it signifies (as one might use a theoretical sign of kindness without the thing signified, by saying ‘I give you my affection’ when one sometimes has the opposite in mind).

238. As to the issue in hand: a sacrament also signifies practically that a practical effect is caused in him to whom it is applied; and thus it signifies that it is a sign certain for the most part or by general rule, as far as concerns the sign.

239. But as to the signification, it is possible that it might be instituted by a creature, because just as a man could impose a theoretical sign of an effect of God (as is plain in the prayer ‘May God give grace to your soul’), so he could impose a sign that would signify practically that God is working invisibly. But a man could not make that sign certain as a matter of rule; for no one can give certitude to any practical sign save he in whose power it is to be able to cause the thing signified by the sign. But only God can determine himself to cause an effect proper to himself; therefore only God can give certitude to a sign, a practical sign, of his own effect.

240. Thus, therefore, it is plain that a sacrament can, as to its being a sign that is certain, only be instituted by God.

241. But insofar as it is a practical sign absolutely it could be instituted by someone else. But it is not fitting so, because the institution of such a sign would be altogether vain: never could the sign get truth from the imposition without someone else from the outside, for the sign is not in the power of the one who imposed or uses it. Nor is it fitting that God should hand over to an inferior the institution of a sacrament insofar as it is a sign that is certain, lest God be an approver of a false or equivocal sign.

242. However, a sign, as it is a sign and as it is a certain sign, can be promulgated by someone other than God, as by a herald. This promulgation, however, is not institution but presupposes institution.

243. Hence it is plain whether a sacrament has its efficacy from institution. For if institution be understood precisely as imposition of a practical sign, then I say it does not get efficacy from its institution, as is plain from what has been said [nn.239-240]. But if institution be understood as a determination of the will of the institutor to cooperate with the thing signified, which institution is not simply imposition of a practical sign but is, along with this, an establishing of the sign as true and certain, then in this way a sacrament does get efficacy from its institution, namely because the thing signified does accompany the sign.

244. And just as in man’s case there would be really one act whereby he determined a kiss to be a sign of reconciliation and another act whereby he determined his will, when the sign was given, to cause what was signified, so in God’s case too there is one act of reason instituting a sensible sign for signifying practically God’s effect, and another act whereby he determines himself really to cooperate with such sign as a matter of rule or always, namely when lack of disposition in the receiver does not get in the way. However these two acts, when concurring together, can be called one complete institution of the sacrament, insofar as a sacrament is a sign that is certain and that is distinct from an equivocal sign.

245. But if this does belong to the idea of a sacrament, as seems to be so from the term ‘efficacious’ [nn.192, 230], then it follows that there belongs to the idea of a sacrament properly speaking that it can only be instituted by God. But if this does not belong to the idea of a sacrament, because whether the thing signified accompanies the sign or not is accidental to the sign, then at least this perfection (the perfection that is its truth or conformity in signifying the thing signified [nn.192, 241]) requires, when added to the idea of a sacrament, that a sacrament be instituted by God, or that God determine himself to cooperate with the sign as a matter of rule.

C. When or for What Period there was Need for a Sacrament to be Instituted

246. The answer to the third article is plain from the first [nn.225-226, 237-238]. For medicine is necessary for any state where there is sickness; and for any state of life (especially after the fall) it is fitting for man to be led to invisible things through some sensible sign. But in every state of life after the fall there is sickness in nature; so for the whole of that state it was fitting for some sacrament to be instituted.

247. But as to particulars, about whether several sacraments are fitting for the time of the same law, and which and how many, will be touched on below [nn.254-257]. Here a general question alone is asked about the time when, as about other conditions pertaining to the institution.

248. Hence it is plain that for the state of the fatherland no sacrament is fitting, because then man does not need sensible things to know intelligible things belonging to his salvation, nor does he then need to be exercised in seeking what belongs to salvation, because he has perfectly obtained salvation.

249. Also for the state of innocence it was not fitting for a sacrament to be instituted as it was after the fall, because although then man was not able to learn from sensible things [Ord. I d.3 nn.186-187], yet no sensible thing was then necessary for leading him to salvation so that it could, by removal of some impediment to salvation, be properly called a cure.

250. But whether marriage, which certainly existed in the state of innocence, was then a sacrament will be discussed later [d.26 n.11-12].

D. Whether Different Sacraments Needed to be Instituted

251. About the fourth point [n.223] one must first see how sacraments can be distinguished, and secondly turn to the point at issue.

1. How Sacraments can be Distinguished

252. On the first point, note that a sacrament is distinguished in one way as a term is into its significations, namely into sacrament properly said and sacrament improperly said. It is distinguished in another way as a higher class is into its lower kinds, and this in three ways. For since it is a sensible thing signifying something, it can be different sacraments because it can be different sensible things. Or it can be a different sacrament having a different signification, and that in two ways - either a simply different signification with respect to different signified things, or a signification different in a certain respect as regard a thing that varies as to more and less.

2. Response to the Issue at Hand

253. As to the issue at hand, I say that one can find in each Law a sacrament that is distinguished in the first way. For just as in each Law there was a sacrament properly speaking (from the third article [n.246]), so there was a sacrament improperly speaking -indeed many such sacraments improperly speaking, as genuflections, bowings, or prostrations on the ground and the like, which can be called ‘sacred signs’ generally and so ‘sacraments’ improperly. These and many others too could have been the same in the Mosaic Law and the Evangelical law.

254. But when talking of a sacrament properly speaking, I say that there ought to have been different ones in each Law; and this (setting aside the other sacraments) was fitting in respect of the sacrament instituted as medicine against the sickness of original sin.

255. For this sacrament had to be different by reason of the signification and by reason of the sensible thing instituted to do the signifying.

256. The proof of the first point is not indeed that it ought to be simply different with respect simply to the other Law. For, from the fact that there was medicine in each Law against the same disease, what was signified by such sacraments was not simply different in the different Laws, but the signification of the one had to be different with respect to the other as to variation of more and less. The proof is that ‘in the development of the human race the knowledge of truth increased’, as is plain from Gregory on Ezekiel 2.4 n.12 [cf. John 16.13, ‘When the Spirit of truth comes he will teach you all truth’]. Therefore, it was fitting that in the later Law the instituted sign signified more evidently the thing signified. Now the later Law was always more perfect, because God, who acts in orderly fashion, proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. But a more perfect Law requires more perfect aids for its observance; therefore, the later Law had to have a sacrament signifying a more perfect grace. Therefore was it thus fitting that in the different laws there was a different signification, and a more manifest one in the later Law and in respect of the signified later thing.

257. From this follows that it was fitting for there to be sacraments different as to the sensible thing that did the signifying [n.255]. For it was more fitting (as to signifying a more perfect grace and for signifying it more manifestly) that a new sign was imposed than that the old one remained. For the old one was, from its imposition, in no way able to signify anything other than what it signified at first. But to impose the original sign or original sensible thing in the second Law for signifying something other than it signified before, or for signifying in another way, was not as fitting as to impose another sign, as is plain even in the case of practical signs imposed by us. For a new sign was more reasonable for signifying the more perfect effect among us, and because to impose a new sign was more manifest than again to impose the old one (which was first imposed for something else).

II. To the Initial Arguments

258. To the first argument [n.218] I say that God was not directly the cause or the occasion of idolatry. For he did not institute those sensible signs as if they were to be believed in or were something of the divine; but he instituted them as signs of the effects of his causing, from which signs the wayfarer could get knowledge and direction for seeking salvation.

259. To the second [n.219] the answer will appear below [n.395].

260. To the third [n.220] I say that no one other than God was the legislator, save as herald announcing the law, and he could thus have been an announcer of the sacraments of this Law but not an institutor.

261. To the fourth [n.221] the answer is plain from the fourth article [nn.256-257], that there were different sacraments instituted for the time of each Law. At least this is plain about the sacrament whereby the main distinction between Law and Law was made. For men of the same Law had to agree among themselves in that sacrament and be distinguished by it from those of the other Law [n.233].